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Weijie Zhong
Weijie Zhong
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
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Optimal dynamic information acquisition
W Zhong
Econometrica 90 (4), 1537-1582, 2022
1212022
The cost of optimally-acquired information
AW Bloedel, W Zhong
Unpublished Manuscript, November, 2020
702020
Auctions with limited commitment
Q Liu, K Mierendorff, X Shi, W Zhong
American Economic Review 109 (3), 876-910, 2019
682019
Lemonade from lemons: Information design and adverse selection
N Kartik, W Zhong
arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.02994, 2023
292023
Robustly-optimal mechanism for selling multiple goods
YK Che, W Zhong
The Review of Economic Studies, 2024
202024
Statistical discrimination in ratings-guided markets
YK Che, K Kim, W Zhong
arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.11531, 2020
192020
Engagement maximization
B Hébert, W Zhong
arXiv preprint arXiv:2207.00685, 2022
112022
Information design possibility set
W Zhong
arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.05752, 2018
112018
Information Acquisition and Time-Risk Preference
D Chen, W Zhong
American Economic Review: Insights, 2024
5*2024
Statistical Discrimination in Two-sided Matching Markets: Experimental and Theoretical Evidence
J Feng, O Gefen, Y Zhang, W Zhong
4*2024
Persuasion and Optimal Stopping
A Koh, S Sanguanmoo, W Zhong
arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.12278, 2024
42024
Rank-Guaranteed Auctions
W He, J Li, W Zhong
4*2024
Selling Information
W Zhong
arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.06770, 2016
22016
Exploration and Stopping
Y Sannikov, W Zhong
2024
Essays on information acquisition
W Zhong
Columbia University, 2019
2019
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