Optimal dynamic information acquisition W Zhong Econometrica 90 (4), 1537-1582, 2022 | 121 | 2022 |
The cost of optimally-acquired information AW Bloedel, W Zhong Unpublished Manuscript, November, 2020 | 70 | 2020 |
Auctions with limited commitment Q Liu, K Mierendorff, X Shi, W Zhong American Economic Review 109 (3), 876-910, 2019 | 68 | 2019 |
Lemonade from lemons: Information design and adverse selection N Kartik, W Zhong arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.02994, 2023 | 29 | 2023 |
Robustly-optimal mechanism for selling multiple goods YK Che, W Zhong The Review of Economic Studies, 2024 | 20 | 2024 |
Statistical discrimination in ratings-guided markets YK Che, K Kim, W Zhong arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.11531, 2020 | 19 | 2020 |
Engagement maximization B Hébert, W Zhong arXiv preprint arXiv:2207.00685, 2022 | 11 | 2022 |
Information design possibility set W Zhong arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.05752, 2018 | 11 | 2018 |
Information Acquisition and Time-Risk Preference D Chen, W Zhong American Economic Review: Insights, 2024 | 5* | 2024 |
Statistical Discrimination in Two-sided Matching Markets: Experimental and Theoretical Evidence J Feng, O Gefen, Y Zhang, W Zhong | 4* | 2024 |
Persuasion and Optimal Stopping A Koh, S Sanguanmoo, W Zhong arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.12278, 2024 | 4 | 2024 |
Rank-Guaranteed Auctions W He, J Li, W Zhong | 4* | 2024 |
Selling Information W Zhong arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.06770, 2016 | 2 | 2016 |
Exploration and Stopping Y Sannikov, W Zhong | | 2024 |
Essays on information acquisition W Zhong Columbia University, 2019 | | 2019 |