| On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward M Carlsten, H Kalodner, SM Weinberg, A Narayanan Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications …, 2016 | 246 | 2016 |
| Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg Games and Economic Behavior 113, 97-115, 2019 | 189* | 2019 |
| Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 130-139, 2012 | 179 | 2012 |
| A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer M Babaioff, N Immorlica, B Lucier, SM Weinberg 2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 21-30, 2014 | 160 | 2014 |
| An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing …, 2012 | 150 | 2012 |
| Pricing lotteries P Briest, S Chawla, R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg Journal of Economic Theory 156, 144-174, 2015 | 125* | 2015 |
| A duality-based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design Y Cai, NR Devanur, SM Weinberg SIAM Journal on Computing, STOC16-160-STOC16-200, 2019 | 105 | 2019 |
| Simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity A Rubinstein, SM Weinberg ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 6 (3-4), 1-25, 2018 | 90 | 2018 |
| Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 370-387, 2012 | 85* | 2012 |
| Understanding incentives: Mechanism design becomes algorithm design Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 618-627, 2013 | 80 | 2013 |
| Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts H Kalodner, S Goldfeder, X Chen, SM Weinberg, EW Felten 27th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 18), 1353-1370, 2018 | 77 | 2018 |
| Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information PD Azar, R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg Games and Economic Behavior 118, 511-532, 2019 | 74* | 2019 |
| Reducing revenue to welfare maximization: Approximation algorithms and other generalizations Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2013 | 70 | 2013 |
| Optimal and efficient parametric auctions P Azar, S Micali, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete …, 2013 | 49 | 2013 |
| Parallel algorithms for select and partition with noisy comparisons M Braverman, J Mao, SM Weinberg Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2016 | 43 | 2016 |
| Bitcoin: A natural oligopoly N Arnosti, SM Weinberg arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.08572, 2018 | 41 | 2018 |
| Formal barriers to longest-chain proof-of-stake protocols J Brown-Cohen, A Narayanan, A Psomas, SM Weinberg Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 459-473, 2019 | 35 | 2019 |
| A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg Operations Research, 2020 | 26 | 2020 |
| Simple auctions with simple strategies N Devanur, J Morgenstern, V Syrgkanis, SM Weinberg Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation …, 2015 | 26 | 2015 |
| Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete …, 2014 | 25 | 2014 |
Constantinos DaskalakisProfessor of Computer Science, MITVerified email at csail.mit.edu
