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eloisa campioni
eloisa campioni
Professore di Economia, Università di Roma Tor vergata
Verified email at uniroma2.it - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
A Attar, E Campioni, G Piaser, U Rajan
Games and Economic Behavior 68 (1), 376-380, 2010
392010
Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market
A Attar, E Campioni, G Piaser
Contributions in Theoretical Economics 6 (1), 2006
292006
Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume
A Attar, E Campioni
Research in Economics 57 (4), 315-343, 2003
222003
Financial literacy and bank runs: an experimental analysis
E Campioni, V Larocca, L Mirra, L Panaccione
CEIS Working Paper, 2017
122017
On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
A Attar, E Campioni, G Piaser
Games and Economic Behavior 111, 1-15, 2018
112018
Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples
A Attar, E Campioni, T Mariotti, G Piaser
Games and Economic Behavior 125, 79-93, 2021
52021
Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games
A Attar, E Campioni, G Piaser
Journal of Mathematical Economics 49 (1), 62-70, 2013
52013
Competing Mechanisms: Communication under Exclusivity Clauses
A Attar, E Campioni, G Piaser
Department of Research, Ipag Business School Working Papers, 2014
42014
Incentives and competition under moral hazard
A Attar, E Campioni, A Chassagnon, U Rajan
Mimeo IDEI, Toulouse, 2007
42007
Credit cycles in a Neo-Austrian economy
A Attar, E Campioni
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 18 (2), 249-269, 2007
42007
Keeping the agents in the dark: private disclosures in competing mechanisms
A Attar, E Campioni, T Mariotti, A Pavan
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16807, 2021
22021
Private communication in competing mechanism games
A Attar, E Campioni, G Piaser
Journal of Economic Theory 183, 258-283, 2019
22019
Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
A Attar, E Campioni, G Piaser, U Rajan
Review of Economic Design 16, 283-296, 2012
22012
Information revelation in competing mechanism games
A Attar, E Campioni, G Piaser
CEIS Working Paper, 2011
22011
Financial Markets and Competition on Contracts
E Campioni
Université catholique de Louvain, Faculté des sciences economiques, sociales …, 2006
22006
Equilibrium (non-) existence in games with competing principals
A Attar, E Campioni, G Piaser
Economics Letters 222, 110932, 2023
12023
Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle
A Attar, E Campioni, G Piaser
CEIS Working Paper, 2011
12011
Monitoring and default in non-exclusive credit markets
E Campioni
Available at SSRN 965716, 2007
12007
Coordination Failure in Experimental Banks of Different Sizes
F Belotti, E Campioni, V Larocca, F Marazzi, L Panaccione, ...
Available at SSRN 4627930, 2023
2023
Born to Run: Adaptive and Strategic Behavior in Experimental Bank-Run Games
F Belotti, E Campioni, V Larocca, F Marazzi, L Panaccione, ...
CEIS Working Paper, 2021
2021
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