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Yeon-Koo Che
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Year
Design competition through multidimensional auctions
YK Che
Rand Journal of Economics 24, 668-680, 1993
12831993
Optimal incentives for teams
YK Che, SW Yoo
American Economic Review, 1996
832*1996
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting
YK Che, D Hausch
American Economic Review, 1999
7671999
Optimal design of research contests
YK Che, I Gale
American Economic Review 93 (3), 646-671, 2003
6042003
Caps on political lobbying
YK Che, IL Gale
The american economic review 88 (3), 643-651, 1998
5681998
Standard auctions with financially constrained bidders
YK Che, I Gale
The Review of Economic Studies 65 (1), 1-21, 1998
4671998
Competitive procurement with corruption
R Burguet, YK Che
RAND Journal of Economics, 50-68, 2004
4082004
Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and applications
E Budish, YK Che, F Kojima, P Milgrom
American economic review 103 (2), 585-623, 2013
4052013
Resolving conflicting preferences in school choice: The “Boston mechanism” reconsidered
A Abdulkadiroğlu, YK Che, Y Yasuda
American Economic Review 101 (1), 399-410, 2011
3632011
Opinions as incentives
YK Che, N Kartik
Journal of Political Economy 117 (5), 815-860, 2009
3112009
Customer return policies for experience goods
YK Che
The Journal of industrial economics, 17-24, 1996
3071996
The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
YK Che, I Gale
Journal of Economic theory 92 (2), 198-233, 2000
2812000
Revolving doors and the optimal tolerance for agency collusion
YK Che
The Rand journal of economics, 378-397, 1995
2681995
Expanding “choice” in school choice
A Abdulkadiroğlu, YK Che, Y Yasuda
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7 (1), 1-42, 2015
2632015
Asymptotic equivalence of probabilistic serial and random priority mechanisms
YK Che, F Kojima
Econometrica 78 (5), 1625-1672, 2010
234*2010
Recommender systems as mechanisms for social learning
YK Che, J Hörner
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 133 (2), 871-925, 2018
228*2018
Robustly collusion‐proof implementation
YK Che, J Kim
Econometrica 74 (4), 1063-1107, 2006
2252006
Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation,
AM Polinsky, YK Che
RAND Journal of Economics 562, 562, 1991
2251991
Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
YK Che, I Gale
Games and Economic Behavior 30 (1), 22-43, 2000
1702000
Efficiency, justified envy, and incentives in priority-based matching
A Abdulkadiroǧlu, YK Che, PA Pathak, AE Roth, O Tercieux
American Economic Review: Insights 2 (4), 425-442, 2020
169*2020
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Articles 1–20