Fuhito Kojima
Fuhito Kojima
Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University
Verified email at stanford.edu - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Incentives and stability in large two-sided matching markets
F Kojima, PA Pathak
American Economic Review 99 (3), 608-27, 2009
4362009
Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and applications
E Budish, YK Che, F Kojima, P Milgrom
American economic review 103 (2), 585-623, 2013
3242013
Efficient matching under distributional constraints: Theory and applications
Y Kamada, F Kojima
American Economic Review 105 (1), 67-99, 2015
241*2015
Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
JW Hatfield, F Kojima
Journal of Economic theory 145 (5), 1704-1723, 2010
2162010
Asymptotic equivalence of probabilistic serial and random priority mechanisms
YK Che, F Kojima
Econometrica 78 (5), 1625-1672, 2010
211*2010
School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action
F Kojima
Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2), 685-693, 2012
1992012
Matching with couples: Stability and incentives in large markets
F Kojima, PA Pathak, AE Roth
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (4), 1585-1632, 2013
1962013
Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
F Kojima, M Manea
Journal of Economic Theory 145 (1), 106-123, 2010
1812010
Matching with contracts: Comment
JW Hatfield, F Kojima
American Economic Review 98 (3), 1189-94, 2008
1442008
Axioms for deferred acceptance
F Kojima, M Manea
Econometrica 78 (2), 633-653, 2010
1342010
Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
F Kojima
Mathematical Social Sciences 57 (1), 134-142, 2009
1242009
Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
JW Hatfield, F Kojima
Games and Economic Behavior 67 (2), 745-749, 2009
1032009
Stable matching in large economies
YK Che, J Kim, F Kojima
Econometrica 87 (1), 65-110, 2019
822019
The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
F Kojima, MU Ünver
Economic Theory 55 (3), 515-544, 2014
762014
Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
Y Kamada, F Kojima
Journal of Economic theory 168, 107-142, 2017
682017
Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
F Kojima, MU Ünver
International Journal of Game Theory 36 (3), 473-488, 2008
662008
Designing matching mechanisms under general distributional constraints
M Goto, F Kojima, R Kurata, A Tamura, M Yokoo
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9 (2), 226-62, 2017
652017
Voter preferences, polarization, and electoral policies
Y Kamada, F Kojima
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (4), 203-36, 2014
642014
Stability and strategy‐proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
Y Kamada, F Kojima
Theoretical Economics 13 (2), 761-793, 2018
522018
Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis
F Kojima, A Tamura, M Yokoo
Journal of Economic Theory 176, 803-833, 2018
512018
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Articles 1–20