| Unbalanced random matching markets: The stark effect of competition I Ashlagi, Y Kanoria, JD Leshno Journal of Political Economy 125 (1), 69-98, 2017 | 245* | 2017 |
| Free riding and participation in large scale, multi‐hospital kidney exchange I Ashlagi, AE Roth Theoretical Economics 9 (3), 817-863, 2014 | 202* | 2014 |
| Nonsimultaneous chains and dominos in kidney-paired donation—revisited I Ashlagi, DS Gilchrist, AE Roth, MA Rees American Journal of transplantation 11 (5), 984-994, 2011 | 190 | 2011 |
| Efficient dynamic barter exchange R Anderson, I Ashlagi, D Gamarnik, Y Kanoria Operations Research 65 (6), 1446-1459, 2017 | 178* | 2017 |
| Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange I Ashlagi, F Fischer, IA Kash, AD Procaccia Games and Economic Behavior 91, 284-296, 2015 | 169* | 2015 |
| Stability in large matching markets with complementarities I Ashlagi, M Braverman, A Hassidim Operations Research 62 (4), 713-732, 2014 | 152* | 2014 |
| Finding long chains in kidney exchange using the traveling salesman problem R Anderson, I Ashlagi, D Gamarnik, AE Roth Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112 (3), 663-668, 2015 | 151 | 2015 |
| Maximum weight online matching with deadlines I Ashlagi, M Burq, C Dutta, P Jaillet, A Saberi, C Sholley arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.03526, 2018 | 141* | 2018 |
| Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof I Ashlagi, YA Gonczarowski Journal of Economic Theory 177, 405-425, 2018 | 134* | 2018 |
| Equilibrium allocations under alternative waitlist designs: Evidence from deceased donor kidneys N Agarwal, I Ashlagi, MA Rees, P Somaini, D Waldinger Econometrica 89 (1), 37-76, 2021 | 125* | 2021 |
| Market failure in kidney exchange N Agarwal, I Ashlagi, E Azevedo, CR Featherstone, Ö Karaduman American Economic Review 109 (11), 4026-4070, 2019 | 102 | 2019 |
| The need for (long) chains in kidney exchange I Ashlagi, D Gamarnik, MA Rees, AE Roth National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012 | 102 | 2012 |
| Optimal allocation without money: An engineering approach I Ashlagi, P Shi Management Science 62 (4), 1078-1097, 2016 | 100 | 2016 |
| Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous pools I Ashlagi, P Jaillet, VH Manshadi arXiv preprint arXiv:1301.3509, 2013 | 96 | 2013 |
| New challenges in multihospital kidney exchange I Ashlagi, AE Roth American Economic Review 102 (3), 354-359, 2012 | 87 | 2012 |
| Monotonicity and implementability I Ashlagi, M Braverman, A Hassidim, D Monderer Econometrica 78 (5), 1749-1772, 2010 | 86 | 2010 |
| An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms I Ashlagi, S Dobzinski, R Lavi Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 169-176, 2009 | 83 | 2009 |
| On matching and thickness in heterogeneous dynamic markets I Ashlagi, M Burq, P Jaillet, V Manshadi Operations Research 67 (4), 927-949, 2019 | 82 | 2019 |
| Sequential mechanisms with ex post individual rationality I Ashlagi, C Daskalakis, N Haghpanah Operations Research 71 (1), 245-258, 2023 | 79* | 2023 |
| Mediators in position auctions I Ashlagi, D Monderer, M Tennenholtz Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 279-287, 2007 | 79 | 2007 |
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