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Salvador Barbera
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Ranking sets of objects
S BarberÓ, W Bossert, PK Pattanaik
Handbook of Utility Theory: Volume 2 Extensions, 893-977, 2004
4862004
Voting by committees
S BarberÓ, H Sonnenschein, L Zhou
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 595-609, 1991
4281991
Generalized median voter schemes and committees
S BarberÓ, F Gul, E Stacchetti
Journal of Economic Theory 61 (2), 262-289, 1993
3351993
Choosing how to choose: Self-stable majority rules and constitutions
S Barbera, MO Jackson
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (3), 1011-1048, 2004
3032004
Strategy-proof exchange
S Barbera, MO Jackson
ASSET, 1992
2851992
Strategyproof social choice
S BarberÓ
Handbook of social choice and welfare 2, 731-831, 2011
2202011
Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
J Alcalde, S Barbera
Economic theory 4 (3), 417-435, 1994
2111994
An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
S Barbera
Social Choice and Welfare, 619-653, 2001
2022001
Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
S Barbera, B Peleg
Social choice and welfare 7, 31-38, 1990
2001990
On the weights of nations: Assigning voting weights in a heterogeneous union
S Barbera, MO Jackson
Journal of Political Economy 114 (2), 317-339, 2006
188*2006
Falmagne and the rationalizability of stochastic choices in terms of random orderings
S Barberß, PK Pattanaik
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 707-715, 1986
1881986
Handbook of utility theory: volume 2 extensions
S BarberÓ, P Hammond, C Seidl
Springer Science & Business Media, 2004
1872004
Strategy-proof allotment rules
S BarberÓ, MO Jackson, A Neme
Games and Economic Behavior 18 (1), 1-21, 1997
1771997
The manipulation of social choice mechanisms that do not leave “too much” to chance
S Barbera
Econometrica 45 (7), 1573-1588, 1977
1741977
A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
S BarberÓ, M Jackson
Social Choice and Welfare 11 (3), 241-252, 1994
1621994
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?
S BarberÓ, D Berga, B Moreno
Journal of Economic Theory 145 (5), 1648-1674, 2010
1462010
Voting under constraints
S BarberÓ, J Massˇ, A Neme
journal of economic theory 76 (2), 298-321, 1997
1351997
A model of protests, revolution, and information
S Barbera, MO Jackson
Revolution, and Information (October 2019), 2019
1272019
Strategy-proof social choice correspondences
S Barbera, B Dutta, A Sen
Journal of Economic Theory 101 (2), 374-394, 2001
1222001
Pivotal voters: a new proof of Arrow's theorem
S Barberß
Economics Letters 6 (1), 13-16, 1980
1101980
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