Input market price discrimination and the choice of technology P DeGraba The American Economic Review 80 (5), 1246-1253, 1990 | 277 | 1990 |
Buying frenzies and seller-induced excess demand P DeGraba The RAND Journal of Economics, 331-342, 1995 | 241 | 1995 |
Bill and keep at the central office as the efficient interconnection regime P DeGraba Federal Communications Commission, Office of Plans and Policy, 2000 | 124 | 2000 |
Efficient intercarrier compensation for competing networks when customers share the value of a call P DeGraba Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 12 (2), 207-230, 2003 | 85 | 2003 |
The loss leader is a turkey: Targeted discounts from multi-product competitors P DeGraba International journal of industrial organization 24 (3), 613-628, 2006 | 78 | 2006 |
The economics of open source software: a survey of the early literature P DeGraba Review of Network Economics 1 (1), 66-74, 2002 | 77* | 2002 |
Downstream integration by a bottleneck input supplier whose regulated wholesale prices are above costs G Biglaiser, P DeGraba RAND Journal of Economics, 302-315, 2001 | 75 | 2001 |
Spillover effects, cost savings, R&D and the use of brand extensions P DeGraba, MW Sullivan International Journal of Industrial Organization 13 (2), 229-248, 1995 | 75 | 1995 |
The effects of price restrictions on competition between national and local firms PJ DeGraba The RAND Journal of Economics, 333-347, 1987 | 52 | 1987 |
Ideological persuasion in the media DJ Balan, P DeGraba, AL Wickelgren Available at SSRN 637304, 2004 | 49 | 2004 |
Quantity discounts from risk averse sellers P DeGraba FTC Bureau of Economics working paper, 2005 | 45 | 2005 |
Intertemporal mixed bundling and buying frenzies P DeGraba, R Mohammed The RAND Journal of Economics, 694-718, 1999 | 38 | 1999 |
Bill and keep as the efficient interconnection regime?: A Reply P DeGraba Review of Network Economics 1 (1), 2002 | 37 | 2002 |
Exclusivity clauses and best price policies in input markets P DeGraba, A Postlewaite Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 1 (3), 423-454, 1992 | 37 | 1992 |
No lease is short enough to solve the time inconsistency problem P DeGraba The Journal of Industrial Economics, 361-374, 1994 | 36 | 1994 |
Central office bill and keep as a unified inter-carrier compensation regime P DeGraba Yale J. on Reg. 19, 37, 2002 | 32 | 2002 |
A bottleneck input supplier's opportunity cost of competing downstream P DeGraba Journal of Regulatory Economics 23, 287-297, 2003 | 29 | 2003 |
Why lever into a Zero‐Profit industry: Tying, foreclosure, and exclusion P DeGraba Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 5 (3), 433-447, 1996 | 28 | 1996 |
Naked exclusion by a dominant input supplier: Exclusive contracting and loyalty discounts P DeGraba International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (5), 516-526, 2013 | 25 | 2013 |
Most‐Favored‐Customer Clauses and Multilateral Contracting: When Nondiscrimination Implies Uniformity P DeGraba Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 5 (4), 565-579, 1996 | 21 | 1996 |